The newly released report from The President’s Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency 1 proposes what may be the most significant philosophical shift in federal disaster policy since FEMA was reformed following Hurricane Katrina. The report repeatedly states that disaster response should be “locally executed, state or tribally managed, and federally supported.”
The language sounds reasonable on paper. Nobody disputes that local officials are the first to respond when disaster strikes. Nobody disputes that states should be prepared and capable. The problem is that this philosophy is not new. In many respects, it is a return to the very framework that failed during Katrina and caused the American public to demand sweeping FEMA reform twenty years ago.
After Katrina, Congress reached a bipartisan conclusion that catastrophic disasters can overwhelm not only cities and counties, but entire states. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was specifically designed to strengthen FEMA because locally led response systems were fragmented and collapsed under the weight of a truly catastrophic event. The reforms following Katrina were built around a lesson that when local and state systems fail simultaneously, there must be a strong national disaster capacity capable of stepping in quickly and decisively.
This new proposal appears to move in the opposite direction.
To be fair, the report correctly identifies many real problems. FEMA’s Public Assistance system has become bureaucratic. Municipalities often spend years navigating debris reimbursement, environmental reviews, procurement rules, audits, engineering disputes, insurance offsets, and eligibility appeals. Entire consulting industries have grown around FEMA compliance because the system itself became too complicated for many local governments to navigate without specialists. Even FEMA officials quoted in the report acknowledge that the process became an administrative maze.
The criticism of bureaucracy is legitimate. The danger is that the reform may confuse two separate problems: FEMA’s expensive and slow bureaucracy and the necessity of a strong federal disaster response. Those are not the same thing.
The administrative monster that developed around FEMA was largely created by years of overlapping congressional mandates, inspector general oversight, anti-fraud rules, environmental requirements, procurement regulations, and political reactions to prior controversies. Every scandal generated another layer of review. Every audit generated another compliance requirement. Over time, recovery became less about rebuilding communities and more about navigating the process and filling out endless paperwork. That system absolutely needs reform.
However, simplifying FEMA’s administrative structure is very different from reducing FEMA’s operational responsibility during catastrophic events. The American people did not demand FEMA reform after Katrina because FEMA was too strong. They demanded reform because government at every level failed when the disaster exceeded local and state capacity.
Communications failed. Logistics failed. Housing failed. Coordination failed. Citizens were stranded while officials debated responsibilities. I still recall FEMA officials asking to borrow my satellite phone in Pass Christian, Mississippi, and wondering if they knew what they were doing because they were so unprepared.
The current proposal assumes that shifting more responsibility back to the states will force states to prepare better. Perhaps some states will. Florida and Texas maintain large emergency management infrastructures and substantial operational capability. But not every state is similarly situated as those two very large states. Smaller states, poorer municipalities, tribal communities, and economically distressed regions often lack the financial reserves, staffing, logistics systems, and insurance capacity to absorb catastrophic losses.
The report repeatedly emphasizes that federal assistance should only be reserved for disasters that exceed state and local capabilities. Yet history teaches that by the time catastrophic overwhelm becomes obvious, delayed federal intervention itself can become part of the catastrophe. To me, that was Katrina’s defining lesson. The cavalry was late to the rescue and then underperformed.
There is also a political reality. During ordinary times, Americans often support reducing federal bureaucracy. But after major disasters, citizens expect the full force of an effective national response. They expect generators, temporary housing, debris removal, logistics coordination, emergency communications, and immediate assistance. When local systems collapse, the public does not suddenly embrace decentralized federalism. They demand national action. This report says the people and systems are on their own, but promises that some money will come faster.
This proposal may create a dangerous accountability gap. States would receive more direct funding and greater authority over disaster operations, but when recovery inevitably fails in some catastrophic event, the public will still blame Washington. The federal government may reduce its operational role on paper, but politically, it will never escape responsibility when Americans are suffering.
That is why I question whether this reform truly solves the right problem.
The real debate should not be whether America wants a “big FEMA” or a “small FEMA.” The real debate should be how we preserve national disaster capacity without preserving the administrative monster that grew around it.
There are ways to modernize FEMA without weakening the federal disaster safety net. Technology can streamline damage assessments. Standardized mitigation approvals can reduce delays. Unified federal applications can eliminate duplication. Direct payment systems can accelerate aid to survivors. AI and real-time data sharing can reduce administrative burdens. Environmental reviews can be simplified without abandoning oversight altogether.
The answer is not necessarily less FEMA. The answer may be smarter FEMA.
Disasters are becoming larger, more expensive, and more complex. Hurricanes, wildfires, floods, cyberattacks, and infrastructure failures do not respect ideology. When catastrophe strikes, Americans ultimately expect their national government to possess the operational capacity to help restore order and stability.
That expectation did not emerge accidentally. It emerged because history repeatedly demonstrated what happens when fragmented systems fail during catastrophic events.
The challenge moving forward is not simply reducing bureaucracy. The challenge is making sure we do not dismantle the very federal capacity the country demanded after Katrina exposed what happens when government response systems are too weak, too fragmented, and too slow.
My concern is that this report says this decision has been made. We are going back to the way FEMA largely operated pre-Katrina. If so, everybody should be prepared for the chaos and needless secondary tragedies that will happen again.
Thought For The Day
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
— George Santayana
1 Final Report and Report Addendum for Implementation Considerations. The President’s Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency (May 7, 2026).
