UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

JOSIE NIELSEN, a single woman,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, and EAGLE WEST INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

Defendants.

NO. 2:22-CV-0177-TOR

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE & OBJECTIONS TO WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LISTS

BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff's Motions *In Limine* (ECF No. 79),
Defendants' Motions *In Limine* (ECF No. 81), Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants'
Witnesses and Exhibits (ECF No. 77), Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's
Witnesses and Exhibits (ECF No. 78), and Defendants' Supplemental Objections
to Plaintiff's Witnesses and Exhibits (ECF No. 133). The Court has reviewed the
record and files herein, the completed briefing, and the parties' arguments.

**DISCUSSION** 

#### I. Motions In Limine

#### A. Legal Standard

"A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular area." *United States v. Heller*, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). *In limine* rulings are "subject to change when the case unfolds . . . even if nothing unexpected happens at trial." *Luce v. United States*, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1982); *see also McSherry v. City of Long Beach*, 423 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005).

#### B. Plaintiff's Motions In Limine (ECF No. 79)

#### 1. Evidence Not Produced in Discovery

Plaintiff moves to exclude any evidence not produced in discovery, noting that the discovery deadline in this matter was August 1, 2022. ECF No. 79 at 3. Defendants agree to the motion. ECF No. 103 at 2.

The Court has the discretionary power to exclude evidence that a party fails to produce during discovery. *See Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc.*, 339 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). Based on this authority and the parties' stipulation, the motion is **GRANTED**.

#### 2. Witnesses Not Disclosed

Plaintiff moves to exclude the testimony of Stephen Airey, a former

employee of Defendants, who was not identified as a person with knowledge or potential trial witness in Defendants' initial disclosures. ECF No. 79 at 3.

Defendants do not object. ECF No. 103 at 2.

Given the parties' stipulation on this matter and the fact that Mr. Airey was not identified in the initial disclosure, ECF No. 76-1 at 33-38, or in an amended disclosure, the motion is **GRANTED**.

#### 3. Benefits From a Collateral Source and Offsets

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' proposed use of evidence of Plaintiff's health insurance as impermissible collateral source evidence. ECF No. 79 at 4-5. Defendants respond that they do not intend to argue that Plaintiff will receive a windfall as a result of her health insurer paying her treatment bills. ECF No. 103 at 2. However, Defendants do argue that collateral source evidence of the at-fault driver's payment and Defendants' payment of personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits is admissible because it is relevant to Plaintiff's UIM claims. *Id.* at 3. Plaintiff agrees that evidence of the at-fault driver's payment and the PIP coverage is admissible. ECF No 123 at 2.

The parties appear to agree that, under Washington law, Defendant may not present collateral evidence of Plaintiff's health insurance. *See Hayes v. Wieber Enters., Inc.*, 105 Wash. App. 611, 616 (2001) (Plaintiffs "are permitted to recover the reasonable value of the medical services they receive, not the total of all bills

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paid."). The parties also seem to agree that Defendant may present evidence regarding Plaintiff's settlement with the at-fault driver and its payout of PIP benefits. Because of these stipulations and the underlying Washington authority, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to exclude collateral source evidence of Plaintiff's health insurer's payments.

The parties also mutually agree that any related argument pertaining to Defendants' potential entitlement to offsets (due to the PIP payment and settlement with the at-fault driver) should be addressed by the Court after trial. ECF No. 79 at 5. Given the parties' agreement on deferring a decision on any offsets, the Court **RESERVES** ruling on that matter at this time.

#### 4. Time and Manner of Retention of Plaintiff's Attorneys

Plaintiff moves for the Court to exclude evidence related to "the time or circumstances" under which she employed her current attorneys, stating it is irrelevant under Rules of Evidence 401-403. ECF No. 79 at 5-6. Defendants stipulate that they will not introduce any evidence regarding the employment of Plaintiff's current counsel. ECF No. 103 at 2. The Court agrees with the parties that any arguments concerning the employment of Plaintiff's current attorneys are irrelevant to the ultimate determination of Plaintiff's causes of action, which have nothing to do with the retention of counsel. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. The Court therefore **GRANTS** Plaintiff's motion.

### 5. <u>Information Obtained After Defendants Refused to Pay Benefits</u>

Plaintiff moves for the Court to bar Defendants from introducing laterobtained reports and other evidence to "justify its previous denial of benefits and
failure to properly investigate the insurance claim." ECF No. 79 at 7. Defendants
agree that the reasonableness of their actions in adjusting Plaintiff's claim must be
judged by the information in their possession at the time of the claims assessment.
ECF No. 103 at 3. However, they argue that later-obtained evidence pertaining to
Plaintiff's recovery is relevant to the jury's assessment of her injuries under the
UIM claim. *Id.* at 3-4. They further submit that the opinions of Dr. Battaglia
should be admitted and that claims handling experts should be permitted to opine
upon the reasonableness of Defendants' actions based on the information in their
possession. *Id.* at 4.

Plaintiff is correct that "an insured may maintain an action against its insurer for bad faith investigation of the insured's claim and violation of the CPA regardless of whether the insurer was ultimately correct in determining coverage did not exist." *Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co.*, 136 Wash. 2d 269, 279 (1998); *see also Bryant v. Country Life Ins. Co.*, 414 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1000 (W.D. Wash. 2006) ("[W]hether the coverage decision is correct . . . is not dispositive of the bad faith claim."). However, Plaintiff speaks in vague terms of what evidence she believed Defendants impermissibly relied upon after-the-fact to justify their

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denial of her claims. See ECF No. 79 at 7 (arguing that Defendants relied upon "later-obtained reports (and [] 'hired-gun' experts) or information [to] justify its previous denial of benefits and failure to properly investigate the insurance claim.").

To the extent Plaintiff suggests that Dr. Battaglia's first report from his independent medical examination (IME) was impermissibly belated, the evidence belies that the IME report was produced after the final offer. Dr. Battaglia conducted the IME on May 12, 2022, and provided Defendants a report on May 25, 2022. ECF No. 44-1. It therefore cannot be said that Defendants' reliance on the IME report was an impermissibly retroactive attempt to justify their final bid since the report was produced before the offer was extended. The Court therefore **DENIES** Plaintiff's motion insofar as it suggests that Defendants have relied on the IME report to justify their final offer ex post facto.

Dr. Battaglia's addendum report is a different matter. The report was submitted one year after the final offer was made. Compare ECF No. 44-10 at 2 with ECF No. 72-6. Defendants therefore may not rely upon the addendum report as evidence of their good faith investigation, as it would constitute an after-the-fact justification of their claims handling procedures. However, the Court agrees with Defendants that the evidence is not subject to total exclusion, because, as outlined in the Court's order on Plaintiff's motion to limit Dr. Battaglia's testimony, it still

may aid the jury's determination of the value of Plaintiff's UIM claim, particularly with respect to her future claimed medical damages. *See* ECF No. 150. The Court therefore **DENIES** Plaintiff's motion insofar as it would wholly exclude Dr. Battaglia's addendum report, but **GRANTS** the motion insofar as Defendants would rely on the report as proof of their good faith investigation.

6. Defense Testimony Regarding Need for Future RFA Treatment
Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude any defense testimony regarding the need
for her future RFA treatment and to rule that Defendants' employees are
unqualified to provide medical opinions. In view of the Court's recent order
limiting Dr. Battaglia's testimony on Plaintiff's need for future RFAs, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff's motion to exclude defense testimony regarding her need for
future RFAs and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion insofar as it states that Defendants'
adjuster-employees are unqualified to provide medical opinions at trial. See FED.

R. EVID. 701 (governing the opinion testimony of lay witnesses).

7. Showing the Jury Any Document or Information Not Admitted
Plaintiff moves to prevent Defendants from showing the jury proposed
evidence or other material not admitted as an exhibit by the Court. Defendants
concede to this motion. The Court therefore **GRANTS** the motion.

8. The Effect of any Lawsuit on Insurance Rates or Premiums

Plaintiff moves the Court to exclude Defendants from "[a]ny comment that

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this lawsuit or award[] [of] damages will impact insurance rates or premiums," because to do so would be speculative and "unfairly prejudicial." ECF No. 79 at 7. Defendants agree. Because the parties are in agreement and the introduction of any evidence to that effect would prove both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the Court therefore **GRANTS** the motion. *See* FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.

#### 9. The Effect of a Damages Award on Nielsen's Pain or Health

Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude any potential argument that an award of damages would not alleviate her injury or health conditions. ECF No. 79 at 8.

Defendants stipulate to this motion. ECF No. 103 at 2. Since the Court agrees that any arguments pertaining to the effect of an award on Plaintiff's health condition would confuse the issues and mislead the jury, it adopts the parties' agreement and **GRANTS** Plaintiff's motion. *See* FED. R. EVID. 403.

# 10. Evidence Suggesting the Medical Treatment and Bills Were Unreasonable

Plaintiff requests that the Court exclude argument suggesting her medical treatment and bills were not reasonably necessary. ECF No. 79 at 8. Defendants do not dispute the amount of past medical expenses and billings, only Plaintiffs' future RFA treatments. ECF No. 103 at 2. In view of Defendants' concession on the matter, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

#### 11. Residence of Plaintiff's Counsel or Experts

Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude any evidence regarding the residence of Plaintiff's counsel or witnesses. ECF No. 79 at 8. Defendant agrees to the motion "provided it is reciprocal." ECF No. 103 at 6. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute the reciprocal application of this motion. *See generally* ECF No. 123. Finding that the parties have reached an agreement on this matter and that any evidence regarding the residence of Plaintiff's attorneys or witnesses would be irrelevant to the issues presented in this case, FED. R. EVID. 401, the Court **GRANTS** the parties' motions.

#### 12. Disclosure of Illustrative or Demonstrative Exhibits

The parties jointly request an order requiring counsel to disclose all exhibits and visual aids to be used during their opening statements prior to making those statements in order to (1) allow the Court time to consider and rule upon any objectionable information beforehand and (2) give the parties' time to review and verify the accuracy of exhibits. ECF No. 79 at 9. Plaintiff requests an order that parties will not be obligated to share visual aids or demonstrative exhibits with one another during trial, but adds that they intend to cooperate. *Id.* In the interests of economy and the parties' agreement, the court **GRANTS** the motion.

#### 13. Taxability of Recovery

The parties are also in agreement as to the fact that Defendants shall not

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present any evidence regarding the taxability of her potential recovery. ECF Nos. 79 at 10; 103 at 2. The Court finds that any argument on the taxability of a potential award would be irrelevant and has the potential to create confusion. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. The parties' agreement as to this motion is therefore **GRANTED**.

#### Testimony or Evidence Plaintiff is Malingering 14.

Plaintiff anticipates that Dr. Battaglia will opine that Plaintiff does not need future RFAs or medical treatment for her neck pain and that she is malingering "because of some unspecified psychological condition or because of the present litigation." ECF No. 79 at 10. The motion is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART** pursuant to the Court's order denying Plaintiff's motion to limit Dr. Battaglia's RFA testimony. See ECF No. 150.

#### Characterization of Plaintiff's Medical Exam by Dr. Battaglia as 15. "Independent"

Plaintiff moves the Court to bar Defendants from referring to Dr. Battaglia as "independent" or allowing them to say that he performed an "independent medical exam" (IME). ECF No. 79 at 11. Defendants report that the word "IME" was contained in the claim file and Plaintiff herself has even referred to the report as an IME report. ECF No. 103 at 6. They further argue that Plaintiff should be ordered not to refer to the examination as a "defense" medical examination, Dr.

Battaglia as a "hired gun" or imply that he is anything other than a privately practicing physician who also does forensic work. *Id.* at 6. In support of this, they state that Dr. Battaglia was hired before they became defendants to this action. *Id.* at 7. Plaintiff retorts that he is not independent because he was hired by Defendants through their lawyer and the suggestion that he has the potential to

confuse the jury. ECF No. 123 at 3.

The Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's motion. Referring to the report as an "independent medical exam" or Dr. Battaglia as an "independent" medical examiner "will not cause confusion to the jury where plaintiffs will have the ability to cross-examine [Dr. Battaglia] as to [his] retention by defendant[s]." *Reardon v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co.*, C10-225 RSL, 2011 WL 13234668 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).

#### 16. Expert Reports

Plaintiff's final motion *in limine* argues that defense forensic experts' reports are inadmissible hearsay and that the Court should strike testimony in their reports along with their planned trial testimony. ECF No. 79 at 10. Defendants answer that Dr. Battaglia's IME report is listed in Plaintiff's exhibit list and part of the record and therefore admissible, but concede that the litigation expert reports otherwise prepared are inadmissible except as used to refresh an expert's

recollection at trial. ECF No. 103 at 8. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute this. See generally ECF No. 123.

Since the parties appear to agree on this issue, the Court **GRANTS**Plaintiff's motion to bar the litigation expert reports as inadmissible and **DENIES**the motion as to Dr. Battaglia's prior IME report.

#### C. Defendants' Motions In Limine (ECF No. 81)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendants' motion because it is 25 pages overlength, and the rule for non-dispositive motions, L. Civ. R. 7(f)(2), only allows for such motions to be up to ten pages in length. ECF No. 104 at 1-2. Defendant replies that it is not overlength, because a motion *in limine* is not a single non-dispositive motion but instead a number of brief motions filed together. ECF No. 122 at 1-2.

It is the Court's preference to resolve the issues on their merits. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to respond to Defendants' motions, and her response brief was equally overlength. *See* ECF No. 104. The Court will consider both briefs in full but reminds the parties to adhere to the local rules moving forward.

## 1. Exclusion of Plaintiff's Insurance Policy

Defendants withdraw this motion base on the Court's order denying their motion for bifurcation or sequentialization but seek to reserve their right to renew it later if the Court accepts a renewed motion for a sequential presentation of the

issues set for trial at a later time. ECF No. 122 at 2.

#### 2. Evidence Regarding Claims Handling, Bad Faith, IFCA, & the CPA

Defendants withdraw this motion based on the Court's order denying their motion for bifurcation or sequentialization but seek to reserve their right to renew it later if the Court accepts a renewed motion for a sequential presentation of the issues set for trial at a later time. ECF No. 122 at 2.

#### 3. Photos of Vehicle Damage

Defendants withdraw this motion based on the Court's order denying their motion for bifurcation or sequentialization but seek to reserve their right to renew it later if the Court accepts a renewed motion for a sequential presentation of the issues set for trial at a later time. ECF No. 122 at 2.

#### 4. Reference to Motions in Limine and Related Documents

Defendants ask the Court to exclude all reference to the motions *in limine*, supporting documents, and the Court's ruling on such motions. ECF No. 81 at 5. Plaintiff does not appear to reject this argument. Accordingly, finding that referencing such motions would be irrelevant and possibly confusing for the jury, FED. R. EVID. 401-03, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

#### 5. <u>Mention of Pre-Trial Motions</u>

Defendants request that any reference to pretrial motions and this Court's ruling on those motions be stricken. ECF No. 81 at 5. Plaintiff does not appear to

disagree. For the same reasons as to Defendants' fourth motion *in limine* and the parties' stipulation on this point, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

#### 6. Exclusion of Portions of Policy Not Pertaining to UIM Benefits

Defendants move the Court to exclude any portion of Plaintiff's insurance policy which does not directly pertain to her UIM benefits. ECF No. 81 at 5-6. Defendants argue that the majority of the policy is irrelevant to the issues presented in this case, and maintain that only a few discreet portions are relevant, such as the UIM policy limits and UIM bodily injury portion of the policy. ECF No. 81 at 7. Defendants believe the Court should indicate the relevant portions of the policy in the jury instructions, and the remainder should be excluded. *Id.* at 6.

Plaintiff responds that Defendant seeks to "exclude the very document the jury must review to decide [her] multiple causes of action, including [the] breach of contract claim." ECF No. 104 at 2. She further submits that the Court can answer the jury's questions about the meaning of the policy during deliberations, or that, if certain provisions require further explanation, Defendants could propose a jury instruction. ECF No. 104 at 3, 5. Defendants reply that they already have submitted a limiting jury instruction which contains the portions of the policy needed to resolve this matter, and that presenting the entirety of the policy to the jury is unnecessary.

The Court **GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART** Defendants'

motion to exclude portions of the policy which do not bear directly on Plaintiff's UIM benefits. On the one hand, the length and complexity of the policy carries a significant potential for confusion. FED. R. EVID. 401. Excluding the title and cover pages, the policy is over 55 pages long. *See generally* ECF No. 44-3. Furthermore, certain segments are patently irrelevant to Plaintiff's claim. For example, the contract contains a Nuclear Energy Liability Exclusion Endorsement, *id.* at 21-22, as well as a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radioactive (NBCR) Agent Exclusion, *id.* at 45-46. Including these provisions may waste valuable time by unduly distracting or confusing the jury. FED. R. EVID. 403.

On the other hand, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that certain portions of the policy not within the UIM coverage section may contextualize the agreement between Defendants and Plaintiff for the trier of fact and aid their determination of Defendants' contractual obligations. Plaintiff shall reduce the exhibit to the relevant pages.

#### 7. Evidence of Size, Nature, or Financial Info of Defendants

Defendants move the Court to exclude information regarding their financials, size, and subsidiaries, and the number of claims its employees handle, characterizing it as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. ECF Nos. 81 at 6-7; 122 at 3. They further argue that such an order would be consistent with the Court's prior

oral ruling at a discovery dispute hearing, ECF No. 24, and written order on a motion to compel, ECF No. 47. Plaintiff responds that information regarding Defendants' size and business is essential background information. ECF No. 104 at 6. She adds that while she "does not intend to unduly focus on CIG's wealth," the jury will need Defendants' size and financial information to determine the propriety of awarding punitive damages, and that an insurer's profitability is relevant to its motivation for minimizing claim payouts. *Id.* at 6-7.

The Court **GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART** Defendants' motion. The Court **DENIES** the motion insofar as it relates to the nature of Defendants' business. The nature of Defendants' business is relevant, because, as Plaintiff describes, information about the claims handling department and its role within Defendants' business may provide valuable background information to the jury about Plaintiff and Defendants' relationship and Defendants' obligations to its policyholders. *See* ECF No. 401.

However, as to Defendants' size and financial information, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion. It is apparent that Plaintiff intends to argue that Defendants were "motivat[ed] [to] minimiz[e] claim payouts and expenses to make [itself] more profitable to the detriment of the insured." ECF No. 104 at 7. The Court is troubled by Plaintiff's attempt to resurrect an issue that was previously resolved on a motion to compel. In an earlier motion to compel discovery,

Plaintiff sought the production of a wide range of Defendant's financial records. *See* ECF No. 37 at 4 ("Plaintiff is seeking financial information beyond the figure that go into the bonus calculations, which would open a window into the entirety of the company's financial records as it includes all documents that go into determining the company's profitability."). The Court denied Plaintiff's motion to acquire financial information beyond the bonus information and related metrics already supplied, explaining, "[t]he outstanding information is broad in scope and not proportional to the needs of the case." ECF No. 47 at 2. Plaintiff may not now argue that information the Court previously deemed undiscoverable may be presented at trial.

#### 8. & 9. Employee Bonus Information & Personnel File Information

Defendants also ask that employee bonus and personnel file information be excluded. ECF No. 81 at 7-8. They admit that the Court permitted discovery of employee bonus and personnel file information of the adjusters who worked on Plaintiff's claim, but point out that the Court's ruling was necessarily limited in scope—specifically, the Court ruled that discoverable information would include notices of discipline for adjusters who improperly evaluated a claim, or evidence of bonuses paid because adjusters recommended not paying a claimant. ECF No. 81 at 7-8 (citing ECF No. 24 at 11). Defendants argue that none of the bases the Court identified as relevant were found in discovery. *Id.* 

Plaintiff responds that evidence related to adjuster bonuses is relevant because the adjusters working on Nielsen's claim received bonuses since the time her claim was made, and courts routinely find that bonus incentive programs are relevant to a court's determination of a bad faith claim. ECF No. 104 at 7-8. Plaintiff also filed several employee performance evaluations under seal, *see* ECF No. 108, which she claims shows that adjusters were encouraged to put the company's interests above policyholders' needs.

The Court **GRANTS** Defendants' motion to exclude employee performance reviews. At trial, Plaintiff may <u>not</u> produce evidence of the employee performance evaluations filed under seal. The Court reviewed those sealed files and finds that they do not seriously establish that Defendants were disciplining employees for overvaluing claims. The files contain sensitive information that poses an acute threat of embarrassment to the private employees who are the subject of those reviews. The evidence is both prejudicial and irrelevant. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.

As for the bonus information, the Court **DENIES** Defendants' motion. The evidence appears relevant to Plaintiff's bad faith claims, and does not carry the same risks as producing other personnel file information.

# Training Materials Not in Effect at Time of Claim or Available Post-Litigation

Defendants ask the Court to bar the production of its training materials

which were provided after Plaintiff filed her claim or which were otherwise not in effect at the time of her claim because it is irrelevant. ECF No. 81 at 8. As they see it, when Plaintiff filed suit, her claims became a litigated matter and adjusters were no longer involved in assessing her claim. *Id.* at 9. Plaintiff replies that the duty to adjust her claim did not end simply because she sued to obtain her benefits. ECF No. 104 at 10.

Plaintiff and Defendants appear to agree that employee training information available and in effect during the time Defendants were adjusting Plaintiff's claim but before she filed suit is admissible. Respecting training information not in effect at the time of the claim or which only became available after suit was filed, the Court agrees that such information is irrelevant. FED. R. EVID. 401. The motion is therefore **GRANTED**.

# Argument or Evidence Regarding Post-Litigation Actions, Settlement Offers, and Litigation Tactics

Defendants move the Court to exclude any argument or evidence regarding their post-litigation actions and offers of settlement and litigation strategy or tactics. ECF No. 81 at 10-12. Plaintiff concedes she will not argue about Defendants' post-litigation legal work or litigation conduct, but states that she does intend to argue about (1) claims decisions made by Defendants after the suit began, (2) evidence that Defendants forced her to litigate to obtain her benefits, and (3)

her request for investigative expenses incurred after litigation. ECF No. 104 at 10-12. Defendants dispute Plaintiff's intent to argue about claims decisions made after the suit began and request for the costs of hiring litigation experts, but do not dispute that Plaintiff may argue she was forced to litigate to obtain the benefits she sought. ECF No. 122 at 7.

The Court **GRANTS** the motion in part. Per the parties' stipulation, Plaintiff may not argue about Defendants' litigation strategies or post-litigation offers of settlement. The Court also grants the motion inasmuch as it seeks to prevent evidence or argument regarding claims decisions made after the suit began, because it was the actions leading up to Defendants' final offer and before suit was filed that gave rise to the actions that formed the basis of Plaintiff's complaint, not actions taken thereafter. *See Richardson v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.*, 200 Wash. App. 705, 716 (2017) (declining to allow the plaintiff to access her insurer's litigation file after she filed suit because (1) it violated attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, and (2) all information relating to her claim for bad faith pertained to decisions the insurer made at the time of denying UIM benefits, before the claim was filed).

Respecting Plaintiff's argument regarding the costs of investigation, the Court **DENIES** Defendants' motion. As the Court outlined in its ruling denying Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 146, a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff's experts' evaluations—particularly Dr. Soto's—were investigative endeavors separate from the bringing of the CPA claim.

#### 12. "Golden Rule" Arguments

Defendants ask Plaintiff to avoid any "golden rule" argument -- arguments placing themselves in Plaintiff's position. ECF No. 81 at 12-13. Plaintiff accedes not to do so, but cautions that she will be present evidence and arguments that she is entitled to enhanced damages under IFCA and the CPA. ECF No. 104 at 12. Defendants agree they will not seek to preclude such arguments. ECF No. 122 at 8. Given the parties' agreement on these points, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants' motion.

#### 13. Exclusion of Non-Party Fact Witnesses

Defendants asks the Court to exclude non-party fact witnesses from the courtroom during the trial. *See* FED. R. EVID. 615. Plaintiff is in agreement. ECF No. 81 at 13. Accordingly, the motion is **GRANTED**.

# 14. & 15. <u>Lay Witnesses May Not Testify as Experts; Experts Are</u> <u>Limited to Their Area of Expertise & Non-Expert Testimony of Medical Diagnoses or Conditions</u>

Defendants request that the Court restrict lay witnesses from offering expert or opinion testimony absent a proper foundation under FED. R. EVID. 701-703,

including the mechanism or cause of the accident and medical symptom causation. ECF No. 81 at 14-15. Defendants further ask that any expert testimony be limited to the area of their expertise. *Id*.

Plaintiff responds that Defendants misunderstand issues of admissibility on lay versus expert witnesses, but that she generally agrees that witness testimony requires a proper foundation. ECF No. 104 at 13. As an example, she explains that lay witnesses can testify to medical-related subjects, such as their perception of a person's symptoms, pain, and suffering without any expert qualifications. *Id.* at 14. It seems Defendants, and to the Court, that Plaintiff and Defendants are in agreement as to this motion. The motion is therefore **GRANTED**, with the caveat that "[l]ay witness testimony regarding Plaintiff's medical condition . . . be limited to conditions that are relevant and that [witnesses] observed without assigning independent diagnoses to the same." ECF No. 122 at 8.

#### 16. Emotional Distress of Plaintiff Caused by Litigation

Defendants move for the Court to exclude any evidence or argument that the litigation has caused Plaintiff's emotional distress. ECF No. 81 at 15-16. Plaintiff responds that the Court should not exclude all evidence about litigation pertaining to her damages, because evidence that she was compelled to litigate to obtain her policy benefits supports her various claims for violations of IFCA, the insurance contract, the CPA, and the duty to act in good faith. ECF No. 104 at 16. She

maintains that "[b]ecause violations of IFCA and breach of the duty of good faith provide for noneconomic and emotional distress damages, evidence that [she] was compelled to litigate . . . and any noneconomic damages resulting therefrom must be permitted at trial to support these claims." *Id.* Defendants reply that, in the UIM context, they step into the shoes of the tortfeasor and may take on an adversarial role, and that therefore Plaintiff should not be able to argue the litigation caused her noneconomic damages, as it would "undermine CIG's ability to litigate her UIM claim and punish it for defending as the at-fault driver would." ECF No. 122 at 9. The motion is **DENIED**. The presentation of this evidence shall be compartmentalized to pertain only to the relevant issue.

#### 17. <u>Undisclosed Evidence</u>

Defendants move to exclude any evidence undisclosed during discovery, including evidence pertaining to her damage to property. ECF No. 81 at 16-19. Plaintiff is generally amenable to this motion, but argues she should be able to produce evidence pertaining to her loss of property under her CPA claim. ECF No. 104 at 17. Having previously denied Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff's CPA claim, the motion is **GRANTED IN PART**, but **DENIED** as to Plaintiff's presentation of evidence regarding damage to property.

## 18. Argument that Coverage was Denied

Defendants also ask the Court to exclude any argument by Plaintiff

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regarding their alleged denial of her coverage. ECF No. 81 at 19-20. Having previously denied Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on this issue, ECF 146, the motion is **DENIED**.

#### 19. Testimony Regarding Forces of Accident

The parties appear to agree they will not present evidence or expert testimony opining on the forces involved in this accident, but stipulate to lay testimony regarding accident descriptions. ECF Nos. 81 at 20; 104 at 17. The Court agrees such testimony would be irrelevant since liability is not in issue and therefore **GRANTS** the motion. See FED. R. EVID. 401.

#### Nature of Defense Counsel's Firm, Practice, or Size 20.

Defendants ask the Court to exclude evidence of the nature of their practice, size of their firm, and types of cases accepted or clients represented by the firm. ECF No. 81 at 21. Plaintiff appears to agree to this motion. ECF No. 104 at 17. Because acceptance of such evidence would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the motion is **GRANTED**.

#### 21. Evidence of Expenses of Litigation & Attorneys' Fees

Defendants state this motion "will be withdrawn if the Court denies [its motion for partial summary judgment]." ECF No. 122 at 9. Having denied their motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 146, Court therefore does not reach this motion.

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#### Reference to the Fact that Proceeds From the Lawsuit Will Be 22. Shared With Plaintiff's Counsel

The parties agree that they will not discuss the fact that any financial recovery by Plaintiff will be shared with her attorneys. ECF Nos. 81 at 24, 104 at 19. The Court accepts their stipulation and **GRANTS** the motion.

#### <u>Discussion of Damages Multipliers</u> 23.

Defendants withdraw this motion. ECF No. 122 at 10. The Court therefore does not consider the issue.

#### Limitation of Expert Testimony to Reports 24.

Defendants ask that the Court limit expert testimony to what was included in their reports. ECF No. 81 at 25. They argue that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, written expert reports must contain "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them." *Id.* (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)). They acknowledge that an expert may supplement, elaborate and explain their report through their oral testimony, but that trial is not an opportunity for the expert to testify as to new opinions not within their report, even if such opinions were expressed through their deposition testimony. *Id.* at 26. Defendants now agree with Plaintiff that the motion does not apply to Dr. Soto (Plaintiff's treating physician). ECF No. 122 at 10. However, they ask that the Court limit Mr. Dietz's testimony as discussed in issue numbered 25. The Court

therefore discusses the limitations on Mr. Dietz's testimony in the following motion and **GRANTS** the joint stipulation that Dr. Soto shall be allowed to give oral testimony beyond what was provided in his expert report.

#### 25. <u>Limit Testimony of Robert Dietz</u>

Finally, Defendants move the Court to limit the testimony of Mr. Dietz, Plaintiff's insurance claims handling expert. ECF No. 81 at 26-27. Specifically, they request that Mr. Dietz not discuss (1) issues of law reserved to the jury, (2) his interpretations of case law, (3) whether Defendants hired Dr. Battaglia because they believed that he would draw a conclusion in Defendants' favor, (4) the impact of corporate bonuses on employees' behavior, and (5) whether Defendants allegedly committed conversion or fraud, and/or improperly produced documents pursuant to the discovery order or that the scope of permitted discovery was somehow improper. *Id.* at 27-35.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants motions *in limine* on Mr. Dietz's testimony is actually an untimely *Daubert* motion. ECF No. 104 at 30. She notes that all motions to exclude expert testimony had to be filed on or before August 4, 2022. *Id.* However, she agrees that Mr. Dietz will not testify about legal conclusions or his interpretations of case law (issues 1 and 2) or issues of conversion or fraud (issue 5). *Id.* at 30, 33.

Defendants respond that the scope of permissible testimony is routinely addressed through motions in limine and that they are not seeking to exclude Mr. Dietz's testimony, but simply attempting to circumscribe it. ECF No. 122 at 11.

Given the parties stipulation, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants' motion limiting Mr. Dietz from discussing issues of law reserved to the jury, his interpretation of the case law, and whether Defendants committed conversion or fraud and/or improperly withheld documents during discovery.

As for the remaining issues, it is difficult to construe Defendants' motion as anything but a belated *Daubert* motion. Defendants' briefing explicitly references Evidence Rule 702 and even quotes a case from this District discussing the *Daubert* standard. *See* ECF No. 81 at 27 (citing *Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2009)). The Court therefore **DENIES** Defendants' motion to limit Mr. Dietz's testimony respecting his intent to testify as to Dr. Battaglia's employment or the impact of bonuses. Of course, Defendants remain free to object or cross-examine Mr. Dietz on these issues as they surface at trial.

# II. Objections to Witnesses & Exhibits

#### A. Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Witnesses

Plaintiff objects to the following proposed trial witnesses: Mr. Airey, Mr. Vavra, Charlie Mitts, and Deputy Michael Swan. ECF No. 77 at 3.

The Court previously ruled on the admissibility of Mr. Vavra's testimony, ECF No. 150, and holds here at *supra* page 3, ¶ 2 that Mr. Airey's testimony is inadmissible. Defendants have also withdrawn their intent to call Deputy Swan at trial. ECF No. 95 at 5.

Charlie Mitts was the at-fault driver who settled with Plaintiff for his policy limits prior to Plaintiff seeking recovery from Defendants. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Mitt's testimony is irrelevant because liability for the collision is not disputed. ECF No. 77 at 3. The Court disagrees. Though liability is not in issue, Mr. Mitt's testimony will provide relevant background information about the circumstances of the accident giving rise to Plaintiff's claims as well as the payment of his policy limits. The objection is therefore **OVERRULED** to the extent it seeks to exclude the testimony of Mr. Mitt and Mr. Vavra. The objection is **SUSTAINED** as it pertains to Mr. Airey and Deputy Swan.

#### B. Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Exhibits

1. Objections to Exhibits 500, 503, 521, 522 & 523

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' proposed exhibits 500, 503, and 521-23 (which contain Plaintiff's MRI imaging, treatment records, and the adjusters' claims notes) as incomplete portions of the record. ECF No. 77 at 2 (citing FED. R. EVID. 106). Defendants respond that they are willing to offer the entirety of those records into evidence. ECF No. 95. As there no longer appears to be a conflict,

the Court **OVERRULES** the objection, contingent upon Defendants offering the whole of those records into evidence.

#### 2. Objections to Exhibits 501 & 502

Plaintiff objects to exhibits 501 and 502. ECF No. 77 at 2. Both exhibits are social media reports of Plaintiff's online profiles and online activity. Plaintiff asserts that these exhibits are irrelevant because one of the adjusters, Ms. Cook, confirmed in her deposition that social media reports played no role in the company's evaluation decision. *Id.* Defendants respond that the reports are relevant for the jury's determination of the extent of her injuries, physical limitations, and other noneconomic damages. ECF No. 95 at 2.

The Court agrees with Defendants and **OVERRULES** the objection. While these reports may be irrelevant to the question of whether Defendants' investigation was reasonable at the time of the final offer, it will assist the jury in evaluating the objective value of Plaintiff's damages as to her UIM claim.

#### 3. Objections to Exhibits 513 & 514

Plaintiff objects to exhibits 513 and 514, which include Dr. Battaglia's addendum report and Mr. Vavra's expert report. ECF No. 77 at 2. Defendants answer that they will not offer the reports into evidence, except as to allow Dr. Battaglia and Mr. Vavra to refresh their memories. ECF No. 95 at 3. Since this appears to resolve the problem, the Court **OVERRULES** the objection, subject to

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the limitations outlined in this Court's order on Plaintiff's motion to exclude the expert testimony of Mr. Vavra. ECF No. 150.

#### C. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Witnesses

Defendants object to Ryan Lewis and Cynthia Mehrtens testifying at trial. ECF No. 78 at 4. In a supplemental objection, they further object to the testimony of Shelley Cook, Tracie Glashan, Martin Ighani, and Robert Dietz. ECF No. 133 at 6.

Shelley Cook, Tracie Glashan, and Martin Ighani are all CIG employees (Ms. Cook and Ms. Glashan are adjusters; Mr. Ighani is an in-house attorney) who were deposed and who Plaintiff asserts played a role in evaluating her claims. Their proffered testimony is relevant, and the Court **OVERRULES** the objection as it seeks to exclude them. Likewise, for reasons outlined in Defendants' motion in limine, *supra* page 28, ¶ 25, the Court **OVERRULES** the objection insofar as it seeks to exclude the testimony of Mr. Dietz. Mr. Dietz, like Defendants' insurance expert Mr. Vavra, may testify so long as he refrains from offering legal conclusions.

Ryan Lewis is another employee of CIG who Plaintiff maintains is charged with training adjusters. The Court **OVERRULES** the motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Lewis. Evidence of Defendants' training program may prove relevant to Plaintiff's CPA and/or bad faith claims but does not pose the same risks

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as admitting employee personnel file information. Thus, while the Court will permit Mr. Lewis to testify, his testimony must avoid reference to employee personnel file information for the reasons outlined in the Court's ruling on the motion *in limine* at supra pages 19-20,  $\P$  8-9.

The Court **SUSTAINS** Defendants' objection to the testimony of Ms. Mehrtens. Plaintiff submits that Ms. Mehrtens was directly involved in adjusting Nielsen's claim "through participating in roundtable discussions." The fact that Ms. Mehrten's participation was limited to "roundtable discussions" without further specification suggests that her adjustment of Plaintiff's claims was, in fact, not so direct. Since those who arguably played the greatest role in Plaintiff's claim adjustment—namely, Ms. Ellis, Ms. Cook, and Ms. Glashan—are available to testify and the Court will permit them to do so, the Court rejects the testimony of Ms. Mehrtens as needlessly cumulative. *See* FED. R. EVID. 403.

## D. Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Exhibits

## 1. Objection to Exhibit 1

Defendants object to admission of exhibit 1, Plaintiff's commercial auto policy. The objection is **OVERRULED IN PART**. Plaintiff may only offer the portions of the policy relevant to the issues.

## 2. Objection to Exhibit 5

Defendants object to admission of exhibit 5, a claims summary chart, on the

grounds that it has not been produced. ECF No. 78 at 2. Plaintiff represents that a
"copy will be provided . . . once complete." ECF No. 94 at 2. The Court

RESERVES ruling on this objection as it lacks updated information as to whether

Defendants have received a copy yet or not.

#### 3. Objections to Exhibits 6-11

Defendants object to admission of exhibits 6-11, which include claims evaluations, loss reports, injury summaries, medical expense forms, and claim performance criteria created by Defendants. Each of these are relevant as to the value of Plaintiff's claim and reasonableness of Defendants' evaluation. The objection is therefore **OVERRULED**.

#### 4. Objection to Exhibits 12-26

Defendants object to admission of various exhibits containing Defendants' employee training program materials and bonus information (exhibits 12-19) and individual employee performance reviews (exhibits 21—25). *See generally* ECF No. 133. For the reasons outlined in the motion *in limine* at *supra* page 20, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to introduce evidence of the performance reviews of individual employees. However, the training materials, bonus information, and testimony of Mr. Lewis which are offered for the same purpose (i.e., to establish Defendants' bad faith) do not carry the same risk of needless embarrassment to private persons and are relevant to Plaintiff's extracontractual claims. The

objection is therefore **OVERRULED** as it pertains to the exhibits offered to show training materials and bonus information and **SUSTAINED** as it pertains to the exhibits regarding the performance and training of individual employees.

Respecting exhibit 20, Defendants' annual report, the Court has now twice ruled that Plaintiff may not offer financial information about the company aside from its bonus structure. ECF No. 47 at 2; *supra* at 19. The motion is therefore **SUSTAINED** as to exhibit 20.

#### 5. Objections to Exhibits 27-29, 33

Defendants object to the admission of Plaintiff's letter requesting benefits, and claim files containing Plaintiff's medical records and bills (exhibits 27-29) as well as a letter from Plaintiff's high school softball coach averring that she could have played college softball but for her injury. These are all patently relevant to the jury's determination of Plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. The objection is **OVERRULED**.

# 6. Objections to Exhibits 31 & 32

Defendants object to the admission of video exhibits showing a hip labral tear (which Plaintiff experienced) and RFA treatment. The Court finds that both videos carry an undue effect of prejudice and would be needlessly cumulative, as Plaintiff already intends to produce witness testimony regarding her hip surgeries

objection is SUSTAINED.

# 7. Objections to Exhibits 49, 50 & 52

and both parties will offer expert testimony on RFAs and their effect. The

Defendants object to admission of emails sent between counsel. The objection is **OVERRULED** as to exhibit 50, which contains information about Plaintiff's medical expenses and records and is therefore relevant to the jury's determination of the value of her claim. *See, e.g.*, ECF No. 124 at 78. The objection is **SUSTAINED** as to exhibits 52 and 49, as they just contain correspondence between counsel and counsel/adjusters commenced after litigation began that would not be helpful to the jury's determination of Plaintiff's damages.

#### 8. Objections to Exhibits 53 & 54

Defendants object to the admission of invoices from Plaintiff's treating physician and Mr. Dietz. For the reasons given in the Court's order on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 146, and Defendants' Motion *in Limine* 11, *supra* 22-23, the objection is **OVERRULED**.

#### **ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

- 1. Plaintiffs' Motions *in Limine*, ECF No. 79, are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
- 2. Defendants' Motions *in Limine*, ECF No. 81, are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

- 3. Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Witnesses and Exhibits are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
- Defendants' Objections and Supplemental Objections to Plaintiff's
   Witnesses and Exhibits are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish copies to counsel.

DATED September 29, 2023.



THOMAS O. RICE

United States District Judge